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I. INTRODUCTION
Without conducting an official poll, it can safely be said that a majority
of lawyers, judges, and scholars agree the nature and scope of bankruptcy
jurisdiction is quite confusing and at times uncertain. 1 There has always
been—and perhaps always will be—a tug-of-war between the legislative
and judicial branches of government over the proper scope of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, 2 with one side expanding the reach of bankruptcy jurisdiction
legislatively and the other side limiting that reach judicially. 3 This poses a
classic separation of powers struggle between the two branches, which has
certainly played out in recent bankruptcy jurisprudence. 4
When Congress created the bankruptcy court system, it gave
bankruptcy judges (formerly called referees) many of the powers of Article
III courts, but without the Article III protections such as life tenure and
The scope of bankruptcy
protection against salary diminution. 5
jurisdiction has seen several iterations, from the first bankruptcy laws
enacted in 1800 to the current jurisdictional scheme established by the
1984 Amendments but further limited by jurisprudence. 6 Regardless of
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1
See Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General
Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 941 (2000).
2 Id. at 773.
3 Id. at 900.
4 See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Exec.
Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.
2594, 2601 (2011).
5 See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 6 Cong. Ch. 19, April 4, 1800, 2 Stat. 19.
6 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. BANKRUPTCY LAW: A
TIMELINE, http://www.rib.uscourts.gov/newhome/docs/the_evelution_of_bankruptcy_law.
pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2015) (In 1984, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments
(continued)
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these various iterations, the legislature’s broad conferral of power to
bankruptcy judges, without providing corresponding Article III safeguards,
has raised and continues to raise serious constitutional questions regarding
the proper scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction. 7
The United States Supreme Court’s most recent decision in Wellness
International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 8 continues the judicial inquiry into
the constitutionality of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdictional scheme. 9 The
Wellness decision 10 substantially limits the jurisdictional impact of the
Court’s earlier 2011 landmark decision in Stern v. Marshall. 11 In Stern,
the Court held that Article III prohibited Congress from vesting a
bankruptcy court with the authority to finally adjudicate certain claims,
even when the bankruptcy court had statutory authority to do so. 12
Wellness, however, limits Stern by allowing bankruptcy litigants to consent
to bankruptcy court adjudication on these types of claims despite the lack
of constitutional authority. 13
To fully appreciate the significance of Wellness, one must first
understand how bankruptcy courts were vested with jurisdiction
historically and how that authority has since expanded and contracted.
This Article examines and explores the history and current status of the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdictional reach, the Wellness opinion and its
significance, and the open questions and issues that remain in the wake of
Wellness. 14

and Federal Judgeship Act, which created the current jurisdictional scheme of the
bankruptcy courts found in Title 28 of the United States Code. As will be discussed below,
the United States Supreme Court has limited the effect of the 1984 Amendments by finding
parts of it to be unconstitutional).
7 See Brett A. Axelrod, U.S. Supreme Court Dramatically Curtails Bankruptcy Courts’
Powers (Sept. 2011), http://www.foxrothschild.com/content/uploads/2015/05/alert_axelrod
_stern-v-marshall_sept2011.pdf.
8 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
9 See id. at 1939.
10 Id. at 1949.
11 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
12 See id at 2601.
13 See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1954.
14 See infra Part IV.
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II. THE APPLICABLE JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS FOR BANKRUPTCY
COURTS BEFORE AND AFTER STERN AND EXECUTIVE BENEFITS
The history of bankruptcy law can be traced back to the ratification of
the U.S. Constitution in 1798. 15 The Constitution grants Congress the
power to make uniform bankruptcy laws. 16 Congress used this authority
numerous times between 1800 and 2005. 17 However, while Congress tried
to expand the bankruptcy court’s reach, the judiciary fought to limit it, thus
beginning a classic separation of powers tug-of-war between the two
branches. 18
It is not necessary for the purposes of this Article to turn the clock
back to the early 1800s. However, as a starting point, the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 (1898 Act) vested jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters in the
federal district courts. 19 Before 1978, the district courts referred
bankruptcy matters to specially appointed bankruptcy referees.20 The
referees (who were designated as judges in 1973) were vested with
summary jurisdiction, which covered “controversies involving property in
the actual or constructive possession of the court.” 21 The referees did not
have jurisdiction over plenary matters, such as disputes involving property
in the possession of someone else, unless the litigants consented. 22 Thus,
where plenary matters were concerned, the district courts retained
jurisdiction unless the parties consented to have their dispute adjudicated
by a bankruptcy referee. 23

15

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Id.
17
See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
18 See Brubaker, supra note 1, at 941.
19 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544–46.
20 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015). See also
Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2170 (2014).
21 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982)
(plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), as recognized in Wellness, 135 S. Ct.
at 1939.
22 Id.
23 See Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2170.
16
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The distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction was quite
confusing and led to much litigation over which types of matters the
bankruptcy courts could and could not hear. 24
The report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States discussed the problems arising from the
summary/plenary jurisdictional allocations under the 1898
Act as follows: “There are . . . serious flaws in the present
allocation of responsibility for handling the administrative
and judicial functions to be performed by
the Bankruptcy Act. . . . The first and most important
objection to the present dispensation is the division of
labor between the bankruptcy court and other
courts. . . . There are several objectionable results to
the division of jurisdiction of the judicial business
generated by bankruptcy cases.
The first is
delay. . . . Another objection to the division of jurisdiction
is the extra expense entailed by the estate in litigating
outside the bankruptcy court. . . . The most serious
objection to the division of jurisdiction is the frequent,
time-consuming, and expensive litigation of the question
whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a
particular proceeding. As Professor McLachlan [sic] has
observed, ‘When a “summary” proceeding in
the bankruptcy court is appropriate and when a plenary
suit is required is one of the most involved and
controversial
questions
in
the
entire
field
of bankruptcy.’” 25
These problems and others led Congress to overhaul the bankruptcy
system. 26 In 1978, after years of research, Congress enacted significant

24

See Ralph Brubaker, One Hundred Years of Federal Bankruptcy Law and Still
Clinging to an In Rem Model of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 15 BANKR . D EV. J. 261, 267–68
(1999).
25 Gallo v. Herpich (In re Cemetery Dev. Corp.), 59 B.R. 115, 118 n.3 (Bankr. M.D. La.
1986) (alteration in original) (quoting EXEC. DIR., COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE
U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 88–91 (1973)).
26 Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2170.
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changes through the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (1978 Act). 27 First and
foremost, the 1978 Act eliminated the confusing and historical distinction
between summary and plenary jurisdiction. 28 Instead, it considerably
expanded the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts by giving bankruptcy
judges jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.29 The 1978 Act vested
concurrent jurisdiction in the district court and the bankruptcy court over
these types of proceedings, which allowed bankruptcy courts to enter final
judgments in matters that would have otherwise been plenary and off limits
under the 1898 Act. 30
The 1978 Act also eliminated the referee system and instead
established a bankruptcy court in each judicial district as an adjunct to the
district court there.31 Under the 1978 Act, bankruptcy court judges were
appointed for fourteen-year terms, subject to removal by the judicial
council of the circuit in which they served on grounds of incompetence,
misconduct, neglect of duty, or disability. 32 The bankruptcy judges’
salaries were statutorily mandated but subject to adjustment. 33
The 1978 Act served to consolidate bankruptcy matters into one
forum: the bankruptcy court. 34 However, many problems remained. The
most prominent was that Congress gave bankruptcy courts many of the
powers of Article III courts (e.g., expanded jurisdiction, ability to enter
final judgments in a wide variety of matters), but without the
corresponding Article III safeguards (e.g., life tenure, protection against
salary diminution). 35

27

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
as primarily amended by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012), and various sections of title 28,
including 28 U.S.C. § 151(2012)); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52–53 (1982) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984),
as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015).
28 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 54.
29 Id.
30 In re Mid-States Express, Inc., 433 B.R. 688, 694 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
31 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; N. Pipeline, 458
U.S. at 53.
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1). See also id. § 152(e).
33 See id. § 153(a).
34 See id. § 151.
35 See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60–62.
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In 1982, the Court in Northern Pipeline considered the
constitutionality of the broad conferral of jurisdiction to non-Article III
bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act. 36 In this case, Northern Pipeline
Construction Company, a Chapter 11 debtor, brought an adversary
proceeding against Marathon Pipe Line Co. seeking damages for an
alleged state-law breach of contract and warranty claim, along with several
other claims. 37 Marathon moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding,
arguing that the 1978 Act unconstitutionally conferred Article III
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts. 38 Marathon claimed that the
bankruptcy court should not have been able to decide a state-law contract
claim against it because Marathon was not otherwise a party to the
bankruptcy proceedings. 39
The bankruptcy court denied Marathon’s motion to dismiss, but the
district court reversed on appeal and granted the motion on the ground that
the jurisdictional scheme was unconstitutional. 40 The issue in Northern
Pipeline was whether Congress’s conferral of jurisdiction to bankruptcy
courts under the 1978 Act violated Article III of the Constitution. 41
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the 1978 Act’s broad conferral of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts violated
Article III. 42 The Court distinguished between cases involving public
rights (which may be removed from the jurisdiction of Article III courts to
bankruptcy courts) and private rights (which may not be so removed) 43
and concluded that claims arising from debtor-creditor relations are
distinguishable from state-created private rights, which belong in an
Article III court for adjudication. 44 According to the Court, Marathon’s
breach of contract suit against Northern, which arose under state law, was a
matter of private rights, subject to adjudication before an Article III court
and not a non-Article III bankruptcy court. 45
After Northern Pipeline, bankruptcy courts no longer had jurisdiction
to enter final judgments in proceedings only “related to” bankruptcy cases
36

Id. at 52.
Id. at 56.
38 Id. at 56–57.
39 Id. at 62–63.
40 Id. at 57.
41 Id. at 52.
42 Id. at 87–88.
43 Id. at 69–70.
44 Id. at 71–72.
45 Id. at 70, 84.
37
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and not those “arising under or in . . . cases under title 11.” 46 The Court
held that Congress might properly grant jurisdiction to non-Article III
bankruptcy judges over matters central to the operation of the bankruptcy
case but not matters only related to the bankruptcy case and predicated on
private rights, such as the state-law breach of contract claim involved in
Northern Pipeline. 47
To say the decision in Northern Pipeline shook up the bankruptcy
system is a vast understatement. The bankruptcy courts were in a state of
uncertainty and crisis,48 with little guidance on what constituted their grant
of jurisdiction. 49 Recognizing the impact of its decision, the Court stayed
its decision in Northern Pipeline until October of 1982 to “afford Congress
an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts . . . without impairing
the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws.” 50
During the interim period between the effectiveness of the Northern
Pipeline decision and the next batch of legislation, all district courts
adopted an emergency rule, or a slight variation of it, which provided for
the allocation of judicial power over bankruptcy cases. 51 The emergency
46

28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012); see N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81–82.
458 U.S. at 71.
48 See Anthony Michael Sabino, Jury Trials, Bankruptcy Judges, and Article III: The
Constitutional Crisis of the Bankruptcy Court, 21 S ETON H ALL L. R EV. 258, 259 (1991)
(considering “the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. a cataclysmic event whose shock
waves continue to rumble throughout the bankruptcy courts”).
49 See id. at 259–60.
50 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88.
51 See Anne G. Maseth, Jurisdiction: A New System for the Bankruptcy Courts, 2
BANKR . DEV. J. 1, 9 (1985). The proposed emergency rule provided as follows:
47

(B) Reference to Bankruptcy Judges
(1) All cases under Title 11 and all civil proceedings arising in or
related to cases under Title 11 are referred to the bankruptcy judges of
this district.
(2) The reference to a bankruptcy judge may be withdrawn by the
district court on its own motion or on timely motion by a party. A
motion for withdrawal of reference shall not stay any bankruptcy matter
pending before a bankruptcy judge unless a specific stay is issued by
the district court. If a reference is withdrawn, the district court may
retain the entire matter, may refer part of the matter back to the
bankruptcy judge, or may refer the entire matter bank to the bankruptcy
(continued)
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rule went into effect on December 25, 1982, and remained in effect until
the enactment of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act (1984 Amendments). 52
After Northern Pipeline, Congress worked fast to mend a broken
bankruptcy system. 53 The legislature went back to the drawing board and
came up with the 1984 Amendments, which were enacted on July 10,
1984. 54 The 1984 Amendments codified the current jurisdictional scheme
for bankruptcy courts in title 28 of the United States Code.55 Three
sections of title 28 are of particular importance to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction: 151, 157, and 1334. 56
The designation of bankruptcy courts is contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 151. 57 That section provides that “[i]n each judicial district, the
bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall constitute a unit of the
district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district.” 58 It
further states:
Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district
court, may exercise the authority conferred under this
chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding and
may preside alone and hold a regular or special session of
the court, except as otherwise provided by law or by rule
or order of the district court. 59

judge with instructions specifying the powers and functions that the
bankruptcy judge may exercise. Any matter in which the reference is
withdrawn shall be reassigned to a district judge in accordance with the
court’s usual system for assigning civil cases.
Id. (quoting Memorandum from William E. Foley and Joseph F. Spaniol, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, to all Article III and Bankruptcy Judges 3 (Sept. 27,
1982)).
52
See id.
53 See id. at 10.
54 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (1984); see 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2012), declared unconstitutional in part by Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
55 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333.
56 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 1334.
57 Id. § 151.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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One major difference from the 1978 Act and the 1984 Amendments is
the characterization of bankruptcy judges as “units” of the district court
rather than as “adjuncts” of the district courts.60 The significance of this
new characterization is that a bankruptcy judge is now a judicial officer of
the district court. 61 This change in terminology and structure is critical.
Under Northern Pipeline, the Court held that bankruptcy courts were not
valid Article I adjuncts to the Article III district courts because the
essential attributes of the judicial power did not remain in the Article III
courts. 62 Under the structure created by the 1984 Amendments, the
judicial power now remains in the Article III district courts. 63 Thus, this
structural change resolves one of the defects noted by the Court in
Northern Pipeline. 64
The issue of jurisdiction and abstention over bankruptcy matters is
covered in 28 U.S.C. § 1334. 65 With respect to jurisdiction, § 1334(a) and
(b) provide in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all cases under title 11.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and
notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers
exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the
district courts, the district courts shall have original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title
11. 66
60

Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as primarily amended by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012), and various sections of
title 28, including 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)), with Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 336 (1984).
61 28 U.S.C. § 151.
62 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality
opinion), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network,
Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015).
63 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333, 333, 341 (1984).
64 Id. at 333, 341.
65 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
66 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)–(b) (emphasis added).
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Under the 1984 Amendments, the district courts have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases arising under title 11. 67
However, the terms “cases” and “proceedings” must be distinguished
because the language in § 1334(a) and (b) make these distinctions. 68 A
“case” refers to the debtor’s entire Chapter 7, 9, 11, 12 or 13 case (from
commencement to termination), 69 whereas a “proceeding” refers to any
discrete dispute arising within the debtor’s bankruptcy case, that is, a
contested matter (e.g., claim objection, motion for relief from the
automatic stay, motion for use of cash collateral) or an adversary
proceeding (e.g., a civil suit seeking avoidance of a fraudulent or
preferential transfer). 70 Note that the term “proceeding” is quite inclusive
and is intended to cover anything that occurs in a case; it encompasses
contested matters, adversary proceedings, plenary actions and disputes
with respect to administrative matters under the current bankruptcy law.71
Under § 1334(b), the district courts have original, but not exclusive,
jurisdiction over three types of civil proceedings: (1) those arising under
title 11; (2) those arising in title 11; or (3) those related to cases under title
11. 72 Although each of the these types of proceedings is subject to the
district courts’ original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, it is still necessary
and important to determine which type of proceeding is at issue because
the type of proceeding affects the abstention and venue rules, among
others. 73 Unfortunately, the distinction between these three types of
proceedings is sometimes difficult to decipher. 74
Bankruptcy jurisdiction is conferred on the district court by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b), as explained above, but § 157 allows the district court to refer
this specific type of jurisdiction and its related powers to the bankruptcy
court. 75 Under 28 U.S.C. § 157, “[e]ach district court may provide that any
or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11
67

Id. § 1334(a).
Id. § 1334(a), (b).
69 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01[2][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2013).
70 Id. ¶ 3.01[3][d].
71 Id.
72 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012).
73 Id. § 1334(c), (d).
74 Nilsen v. Neilson (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), 419 B.R. 807, 818 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2009).
75 28 U.S.C. § 157, declared unconstitutional as applied in part by Stern v. Marshall,
131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
68
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or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the
bankruptcy judges for the district.” 76 Although district courts have total
discretion over whether to refer bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the
bankruptcy courts, they all universally do; 77 all district courts have rules in
place that automatically refer bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the
bankruptcy courts within their districts without the necessity of any further
action. 78
Once a bankruptcy case or proceeding has been referred to the
bankruptcy judge, the district court may still withdraw the reference and
take back the case.79 The district court’s authority to withdraw the
reference is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 157, which provides for mandatory
and permissive withdrawal. 80
The types of matters bankruptcy judges may hear and determine are
found in 28 U.S.C. § 157. 81
Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under
title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in a case under title 11, referred under subsection
(a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and
judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this
title. 82
All cases are within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to hear and
determine, but not all proceedings are. 83 Instead, only “core” proceedings
“arising under,” “arising in,” or “referred under subsection (a),” are subject
to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction for both hearings and final
determinations. 84 The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of sixteen core
proceedings as follows:
76

Id. § 157(a) (emphasis added).
Bankruptcy
Court,
CLIENT
FIRST
BANKRUPTCY,
http://www.clientfirstbankruptcy.com/ bankruptcy-court/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
78 See Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Reaffirm Authority of Bankruptcy
Judges Based on Parties’ Consent, SCOTUSBLOG (May 27, 2015, 2:27 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/05/opinion-analysis-justices-reaffirm-authority-ofbankruptcy-judges-based-on-parties-consent/.
79 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
80 Id.
81 Id. § 157(b)(1).
82 Id.
83 Id. § 157(a).
84 Id. § 157(b)(1).
77
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(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to—
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the
estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and
estimation of claims or interests for the purposes of
confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11
but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or
unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims
against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case
under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing
claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover
preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the
automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover
fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of
particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of
liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property,
including the use of cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than
property resulting from claims brought by the estate
against persons who have not filed claims against the
estate;
(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the
assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor

[44:67
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or the equity security holder relationship, except personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims; and
(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other
matters under chapter 15 of title 11. 85
Again, this is a non-exclusive list of types of matters considered core. 86
If a matter is not core, then it follows that the matter is non-core. And if it
is non-core, then the bankruptcy court’s authority is much more limited
under the statute. 87 A bankruptcy court may hear and determine a non-core
matter and enter orders or judgments only with the consent of the parties. 88
Without consent, a bankruptcy court can only submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review. 89 It is
within the bankruptcy judge’s province to determine whether a proceeding
is core or non-core. 90
The Executive Benefits Court aptly explained the 1984 Amendments:
Put simply: If a matter is core, the statute empowers the
bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on the claim,
subject to appellate review by the district court. If a matter
is non-core, and the parties have not consented to final
adjudication by the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge
must propose findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Then, the district court must review the proceeding de
novo and enter final judgment. 91
With the 1984 Amendments in place, all was well and good in the
bankruptcy world for almost five years, at which time the Supreme Court
of the United States examined the constitutionality of the new law. 92 In
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, the Court examined the issue of whether
a party who had not filed a claim against a debtor’s bankruptcy estate had a
right to a jury trial when sued by the bankruptcy trustee to recover an
alleged fraudulent transfer. 93 Recall that under the 1984 Amendments,
85

Id. § 157(b)(2)(A)–(P).
Id. § 157(b)(2).
87 Id. § 157(b)(3).
88 Id. § 157(c)(2).
89 Id. § 157(c)(1).
90 Id. § 157(b)(3).
91 Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2014).
92 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989).
93 Id.
86
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proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances are
core, which means that these actions are subject to the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction for both hearings and final determinations. 94
The Court held that the Seventh Amendment entitled such a party to a
jury trial, despite the fact that Congress had designated proceedings to
determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances as core under the
1984 Amendments. 95 The Court’s decision turned on the fact that the party
being sued by the bankruptcy trustee had not filed a claim against the
debtor’s estate. 96 The Court noted that there was no evidence that
Congress considered the constitutional implications of its designation of all
fraudulent conveyance actions as core.97 The Court dismissed concerns
that its decision would slow down bankruptcy cases by stating that those
reasons were insufficient to overcome the Seventh Amendment. 98
Without question, the Court’s decision in Granfinanciera dealt at least
a limited blow to the constitutionality of the 1984 Amendments. 99
Although not quite as strong as the hit from Northern Pipeline, 100 the Court
declared that Congress went too far with its jurisdictional grant to the
bankruptcy courts. 101 That being said, the Court was very careful to state
that its decision did not dismantle the 1984 Amendments. 102 Moreover, the
very next year the Court had another opportunity to examine a very similar
issue in Langenkamp v. Culp. 103
The issue in Langenkamp was whether a party who had filed a claim
against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate was entitled to a jury trial when sued
by the bankruptcy trustee to recover allegedly preferential transfers. 104
94

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (2)(H).
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36.
96 Id. at 58 (“Because petitioners . . . have not filed claims against the estate,
respondent’s fraudulent conveyance action does not arise ‘as part of the process of
allowance and disallowance of claims.’”).
97
Id. at 60.
98 Id. at 63.
99 Id. at 61–62 n.16.
100 Compare N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(concluding that broad granting of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts is unconstitutional),
with Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that Congress cannot strip parties of their
right to a jury trial).
101 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 52.
102 Id. at 61.
103 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990) (per curiam).
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Like the alleged fraudulent transfers in Granfinanciera, the proceedings at
issue to determine, avoid, or recover preferences are core under the 1984
Amendments. 105 In Langenkamp, the Court held that the party was not
entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because it had filed a
claim against the debtor’s estate, thus triggering the process of allowance
and disallowance of claims and subjecting the party to the bankruptcy
Thus, under both Granfinanciera and
court’s equitable power. 106
Langenkamp, a party’s right to a jury trial on an issue within the
bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction depends on whether that party filed a
claim against the debtor’s estate. 107 The Court’s holding in Langenkamp
thus reaffirmed Granfinanciera. 108
All was relatively quiet and calm in the bankruptcy world for the
twenty or so years following Langenkamp. The 1984 Amendments
remained in force despite the relatively small limitations imposed by
Granfinanciera and Langenkamp. 109 This period of calm came to a
screeching halt in 2011, however, when the Court decided Stern v.
Marshall. 110
The facts and procedural history in Stern are long, complex, and quite
interesting. 111 The Stern case stemmed from a bitter dispute between
bankruptcy debtor Vickie Lynn Marshall a/k/a Anna Nicole Smith and
Pierce Marshall over the distribution of the much older J. Howard
Marshall’s vast wealth. 112 J. Howard Marshall was Vickie’s husband and
Pierce’s father. 113 J. Howard excluded Vickie from his will. 114 Before J.
Howard died, Vickie sued Pierce in Texas state court alleging that Pierce
fraudulently induced his father to exclude Vickie. 115
After J. Howard’s death, Vickie filed for bankruptcy relief. 116 Pierce
made two significant moves in Vickie’s bankruptcy case. First, he initiated
105

As a core proceeding, the bankruptcy court has statutory authority to hear the claims.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) (2012).
106
Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 44.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610–11 (2011).
110 Id. at 2601.
111 Id. at 2600.
112 Id. at 2601.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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an adversary proceeding in Vickie’s bankruptcy case by filing a complaint
against her claiming that she and her lawyers had defamed him in
connection with the Texas state court litigation. 117 In this complaint, he
also sought a declaration that his defamation claim was non-dischargeable
in her bankruptcy case. 118 Second, Pierce filed a proof of claim in Vickie’s
bankruptcy case for the defamation action. 119 Vickie responded to the
complaint by asserting truth as a defense and by filing a counterclaim
against Pierce asserting tortious interference with the gift she expected
from J. Howard. 120
In November of 1999, the bankruptcy court granted Vickie summary
judgment on Pierce’s defamation claim. 121 And almost a year later, after a
bench trial, the bankruptcy court issued a judgment in Vickie’s favor on
her counterclaim, awarding her over $400 million in compensatory
damages and $25 million in punitive damages. 122 In the post-trial
proceedings, Pierce complained that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim because it was not a core
proceeding. 123 The bankruptcy court concluded that it was a core
proceeding and, therefore, determined it had power to enter final
judgment. 124
The district court, however, disagreed and held that Vickie’s
counterclaim was not a core proceeding because it was only marginally
related to the claim against which it was asserted. 125 The district court
relied on its reading of Northern Pipeline in holding “that it would be
unconstitutional to hold that any and all counterclaims are core.” 126 By
finding that the counterclaim was not core, the district court treated the
bankruptcy court’s judgment as proposed and instead engaged in an
independent review of the record. 127 After independently reviewing the
record, the district court entered judgment in Vickie’s favor and awarded
her compensatory and punitive damages, each in the amount of
117

Id.
Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 2602.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
118

2016]

WELLNESS INTERNATIONAL NETWORK V. SHARIF

83

$44,292,767.33. 128 In the background of the district court’s independent
review, the Texas state court had already entered judgment on the related
litigation, but in Pierce’s favor. 129
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that a
counterclaim is a core proceeding arising “only if [it] is so closely related
to [a creditor’s] proof of claim that the resolution of the counterclaim is
necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim itself.” 130
According to the court of appeals, Vickie’s counterclaim was not core and
thus the district court erred by not giving preclusive effect to the Texas
state court judgment in Pierce’s favor, which was the earliest final
judgment on the issues involved in the litigation. 131
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court was
confronted with two main issues in Stern. 132 The first was whether
Vickie’s counterclaim for tortious interference was core and thus subject to
final resolution by the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). 133 If the
counterclaim was core, the second then was whether the statutory authority
conferring jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court is constitutional. 134
Regarding the first issue, the Court reversed the court of appeals by
determining that Vickie’s counterclaim was indeed a core proceeding
under the plain text of § 157(b)(2)(C). 135 That statute provides that core
proceedings include counterclaims by the estate against persons filing
claims against the estate. 136 Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim
was against Pierce, who had filed a claim against the estate.137 Pierce
argued that Vickie’s counterclaim did not arise in a title 11 case or arise
under a title 11 case, therefore it was not a core proceeding. 138 The Court
disagreed and stated that whether the matter arose in or under a title 11
case was not determinative of whether it should receive core treatment;
Congress did not specify how to differentiate between a core matter that
128
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130 Id. See also Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1040, 1058 (9th Cir.
2010).
131 In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1064–65.
132 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600, 2603.
133 Id. at 2600.
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136 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2012).
137 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
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arises in or under title 11 and a core matter that did not. 139 The Court
declined to rewrite the statute to bypass the second issue regarding the
statute’s constitutionality. 140
The Court’s treatment of the second issue was considerably more
complicated. The Court held that although § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the
bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on Vickie’s tortious interference
counterclaim as core, Article III of the Constitution does not. 141 The
significance of this holding cannot be understated. This was the first time
since Granfinanciera that the Court struck down part of the 1984
Amendments on constitutional grounds. 142
The Court’s reasoning was premised on Article III and the Court’s
prior jurisprudence, including Northern Pipeline and other notable cases. 143
The Court began by quoting Article III, Section 1: “[T]he Constitution
mandates that ‘[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.’” 144
The Court stressed that Article III imposes some basic limitations that
the other branches cannot transgress, such as separation of powers and the
protection of liberty, by defining the characteristics of Article III judges,
specifically life tenure and the protection against salary diminution. 145 The
Court emphasized that Article III could not serve its own purpose if other
branches of government could confer judicial power on entities outside
Article III. 146
The Court reiterated the importance of its holding in Northern
Pipeline, but then turned its attention to the 1984 Amendments. 147 The
Court compared the broad conferral of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts
in the 1984 Amendments to what existed previously. 148 The Stern Court
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Id. at 2605.
Id.
141 Id. at 2608.
142 Christopher S. Lockman, Makalíduñg’s Post: How Stern v. Marshall Is Shaking
Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Its Core, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 125, 136; see also Stern, 131 S.
Ct. at 2614.
143 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608.
144 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
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expressed concern over the limited appellate review that bankruptcy court
judgments would receive. 149
The Court explained that Vickie’s counterclaim did not fall within any
of the varied formulations of the public rights exception, but instead, arose
under state common law between two private parties.150 The Court stated:
What is plain here is that this case involves the most
prototypical exercise of judicial power: the entry of a final,
binding judgment by a court with broad substantive
jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the
action neither derives from nor depends upon any agency
regulatory regime. If such an exercise of judicial power
may nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judiciary
simply by deeming it a part of some amorphous “public
right,” then Article III would be transformed from the
guardian of individual liberty and separation of powers we
have long recognized into mere wishful thinking. 151
The Court also responded to Vickie’s attempt to distinguish Northern
Pipeline and Granfinanciera on the ground that Pierce, unlike the
defendants in those cases, had actually filed a claim against the estate. 152
Vickie argued that because Pierce had filed a claim in her bankruptcy case,
the bankruptcy court had authority to adjudicate her counterclaim under the
Court’s holding in Langenkamp. 153 The Court disagreed and stated that
Pierce’s decision to file a claim in Vickie’s bankruptcy case should not
govern the characterization of Vickie’s counterclaim because Pierce’s
claim for defamation in no way affected the nature of Vickie’s
counterclaim for tortious interference as one at common law, which must
be decided by an Article III court. 154
The Court also rejected Vickie’s argument that Pierce consented to the
resolution of her counterclaim by the bankruptcy court. 155 Although it was
clear that Pierce consented to the bankruptcy court’s resolution of his
defamation action against Vickie and of the resolution of his proof of
claim, it was equally clear that he objected to the bankruptcy court’s
149
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exercise of jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim. 156 The Court found
Pierce did not truly consent to resolution of the counterclaim because he
had nowhere else to go if he wished to recover from Vickie’s estate.157
The Court characterized its decision in Stern as narrow and one that
did not meaningfully change the division of labor within the current
statute. 158 The Court stressed that its decision was meant to stop legislative
encroachment on the judicial power established by Article III. 159 The
Court concluded that Congress exceeded the limitations of Article III, in
one isolated respect, through the 1984 Amendments. 160 By limiting the
improper encroachment of power to one area of the 1984 Amendments, the
Court made it clear that it did not abrogate the bankruptcy system.
Although the Court’s five-to-four decision in Stern did not go quite as
far as Northern Pipeline, it certainly sent a shockwave through the
bankruptcy court system and left open for discussion important questions
regarding the types of cases bankruptcy courts would continue to hear after
Stern. 161 Some commentators have read Stern to conclude only that “the
United States’ bankruptcy system sits on a split foundation.” 162 Others
have remarked that the landmark decision caused “upheaval” and
“consternation amongst jurists, practitioners, and academics.” 163 The
Court and commentators agree, however, that the complexity of the case
and lack of clarity in application are analogous to the work of Charles
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Dickens. 164 The Stern holding has become the gospel for litigants
tactically or strategically seeking a forum other than bankruptcy court. 165
Notably, Stern did not address at least two critical questions. First, it
failed to address how bankruptcy or district courts should handle a socalled “Stern claim,” that is, a claim that is core under the statute and thus
subject to final adjudication by the bankruptcy court, but that a bankruptcy
court cannot decide as a constitutional matter due to the Court’s holding in
Stern. 166 Second, it did not address whether parties could consent to
bankruptcy court adjudication of a Stern claim. 167
Almost three years later, the Court answered the first question in its
very narrow, unanimous decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency
v. Arkison. 168 In Executive Benefits, the Court first acknowledged that in
Stern, it did not decide how bankruptcy or district courts should proceed
when encountering a Stern claim. 169 It noted that lower courts had
described Stern claims as falling within a statutory gap: a Stern claim is
core and thus subject to final adjudication by the bankruptcy court pursuant
to the statute, but the bankruptcy court is constitutionally prohibited from
adjudicating the claim, whereas with a non-core matter, a bankruptcy court
proceeds pursuant to § 157(c)(1) by submitting proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review. 170 Many
lower courts were confused about how to proceed with Stern claims
because they do not fit into either category. 171
The Court held that when a bankruptcy court encounters a Stern claim,
§ 157(c)(1) applies, which permits the bankruptcy court to treat the Stern
claim as non-core and thus issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions

164

See Latoya C. Brown, No More Ping-Pong: The Need For Article III Status in
Bankruptcy After Stern v. Marshall, 8 FIU L. REV. 559, 559 (2013) (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct.
at 2600 (quoting 1 CHARLES DICKENS, Bleak House, in THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS 4,
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165 See David E. Leta, Stern v. Marshall Changes the Landscape of Bankruptcy Court
Jurisdiction, 26 UTAH B.J. 34, 36 (2013) (citing In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299,
308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
166 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611, 2620.
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of law to the district court for de novo review. 172 The district court will
then “review the claim de novo and enter judgment.” 173 This holding
reaffirmed that Stern was intended to be narrowly construed. 174 To hold
otherwise might have meant that the district courts would hear Stern claims
in the first instance, which would have substantially changed the division
of labor in the current statute and would have been contrary to Stern. 175
The Court explained that the statute contains a severability provision
which states that “[i]f any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act, or the
application of that provision to persons or circumstances other than those
as to which it is held invalid, is not affected thereby.” 176 Thus, Stern
invalidated a small portion of the statute, but not all of it. The Court
concluded that this severability provision closes the so-called gap in the
statute created by Stern claims because the remainder of the Act (not
invalidated by Stern) includes § 157(c), which governs non-core
proceedings. 177
Executive Benefits did not answer the second question left open by
Stern: the issue of consent. Because the Court concluded that the
petitioning party received the de novo review it was entitled to, it
specifically reserved the consent issue for another day. 178 That day was
May 26, 2015, when the Court decided Wellness International Network,
Ltd. v. Sharif. 179

III. SUMMARY OF THE WELLNESS DECISION
The landmark Wellness case began as a contract dispute.180 Wellness
International Network, a manufacturer of health and nutrition products,
entered into a contract with Sharif, whereby Sharif agreed to distribute
Wellness’s products. 181 This relationship deteriorated quickly and disputes
172

Id. While the outlined procedure was not followed precisely in this case, the Court
affirmed the lower court’s decision anyway because the petitioners received the de novo
review from the district court that they were entitled to receive. Id. at 2174.
173 Id. at 2170.
174 Id. at 2173; Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).
175 Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2173; see also Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
176 Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2173; see also 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
177 Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2173; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(c).
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arose between the parties. 182 In 2005, Sharif sued Wellness in a federal
district court in Texas. 183 In this litigation, Sharif did not respond to
Wellness’s discovery requests, which ultimately resulted in default
judgment for Wellness. 184 The district court also sanctioned Sharif by
awarding Wellness over $650,000 in attorneys’ fees. 185 Wellness tried for
many years to collect on this judgment but was unsuccessful. 186
Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief in February 2009 in the
Northern District of Illinois.187 Sharif’s bankruptcy schedules listed
Wellness as a creditor. 188 Through his bankruptcy case, Sharif sought to
discharge the debt he owed to Wellness as a result of the state court
litigation. 189 Wellness requested documents related to Sharif’s assets,
which Sharif did not provide. 190 Wellness obtained an older loan
application that Sharif filed in 2002, which showed that Sharif had more
than $5 million in assets. 191 When asked about these significant assets,
Sharif told Wellness and the Chapter 7 Trustee assigned to his case that he
lied on that particular loan application and that the listed assets actually
belonged to a trust he administered for his mother. 192 Wellness requested
more information about this trust, but Sharif did not provide it. 193
Wellness commenced an adversary proceeding against Sharif in his
bankruptcy case by filing a complaint objecting to Sharif’s discharge,
seeking a declaration that the trust was Sharif’s alter ego, and thus deeming
trust assets as part of Sharif’s bankruptcy estate. 194 Wellness alleged that
Sharif was concealing property from his bankruptcy estate by claiming it
was owned by the trust. 195 Thus, Wellness argued Sharif should be denied
a discharge of all debts. 196
182
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In his answer, Sharif admitted that Wellness’s adversary proceeding
was a core proceeding subject to final adjudication by the bankruptcy
court. 197 Similar to his failures in the state court litigation, Sharif did not
answer Wellness’s discovery requests in the bankruptcy court litigation.198
In July 2010, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that Sharif had violated the
discovery order. 199 The bankruptcy court granted a default judgment
against Sharif in the adversary proceeding after denying Sharif’s request
for a discharge. 200 The judgment granted Wellness all of the relief it had
requested regarding the denial of Sharif’s discharge, and it also included a
declaration that the trust assets were in fact property of Sharif’s bankruptcy
estate. 201
Sharif appealed to the District Court. 202 However, Stern was decided
six weeks before Sharif filed his opening brief in the appeal. 203 Sharif did
not cite Stern in his opening brief, but he moved to supplement his briefing
to argue that, under Stern, the bankruptcy court’s judgment should be
treated as a mere report and recommendation. 204 The district court denied
Sharif’s request to supplement his briefing with the Stern objection—
finding it was untimely raised—and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
judgment. 205
Sharif appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 206 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 207 The Seventh
Circuit found that Sharif’s Stern objection, although untimely, could still
be made because it was not waivable.208 The Seventh Circuit agreed
almost completely with the bankruptcy court’s reasoning to resolve
Wellness’s adversary complaint. 209 The Seventh Circuit, however, did not
agree with the bankruptcy court’s resolution of Wellness’s request for a
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declaration that the trust assets were assets of Sharif’s bankruptcy estate. 210
It concluded that this particular issue presented a Stern claim and thus was
not capable of final adjudication by the bankruptcy court as a constitutional
matter. 211
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Seventh
Circuit. 212 The main issue before the Court was “whether allowing
bankruptcy courts to decide Stern claims by consent would ‘impermissibly
threaten the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.’” 213 The Court
held “that allowing bankruptcy litigants to waive the right to Article III
adjudication of Stern claims does not usurp the constitutional prerogatives
of Article III courts.” 214
The Court stated that it could not answer this question without
considering the practical effects of its decision on the federal judiciary. 215
This point cannot be overstated. A contrary ruling in this case would have
immediately and dramatically increased the caseload of the already
overburdened district courts.
Other than the overriding practical
significance of its decision, the Court’s holding in Wellness was based on
two premises. First, adjudication by consent of the parties is nothing new,
and case law makes it clear that litigants may validly consent to
adjudication by bankruptcy courts. 216 Second, permitting bankruptcy
courts to decide Stern claims through consent of the parties does not
threaten the judicial branch in any way. 217
In determining that parties could validly consent to adjudication of a
Stern claim by a non-Article III court, the Court relied quite heavily on its
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prior decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor. 218
The Court described Schor as the “foundational case in the modern era.” 219
In Schor, the Court considered whether the Commodity Exchange Act
empowered the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to entertain state
law counterclaims in reparation proceedings, and if so, whether that grant
of authority violated Article III of the Constitution. 220 The Court held “that
Article III does not confer on litigants the absolute right to the plenary
consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court.” 221 The
Court explained that “Article III, § 1’s guarantee of an independent and
impartial adjudication . . . serves to protect primarily personal, rather than
structural, interests.” 222 Thus, the Court held that those personal interests
(i.e., to an Article III adjudication) can be waived, just as other personal
constitutional rights (e.g., a right to a jury trial) can be waived. 223
In the few short years following Schor, the Court decided two cases
that reaffirmed the importance of consent to the constitutional analysis. 224
The issue in each case was “whether the Federal Magistrate Act authorized
magistrate judges to preside over jury selection in a felony trial.”225 In one
case, the defendant consented; in the other case, the defendant did not. 226
The presence or absence of consent in those cases was dispositive to the
issues before the Court. 227 The Court’s decision in each case was
consistent with its prior holding in Schor. 228
The Wellness Court summarized its prior jurisprudence approving
adjudication by consent, as follows:
The lesson of Schor, Peretz, and the history that
preceded them is plain: The entitlement to an Article III
adjudicator is “a personal right” and thus ordinarily
“subject to waiver.” Article III also serves a structural
218
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purpose, “barring congressional attempts ‘to transfer
jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of
emasculating’ constitutional courts and thereby
prevent[ing] ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other.’” But allowing Article
I adjudicators to decide claims submitted to them by
consent does not offend the separation of powers so long
as Article III courts retain supervisory authority over the
process. 229
After concluding that parties may validly consent to adjudication by
non-Article III tribunals, the Court turned its attention to the issue of
whether allowing bankruptcy courts to decide Stern claims by consent
would impermissibly threaten the constitutional integrity of the judicial
branch. 230 To answer this question, the Court weighed
the extent to which the essential attributes of judicial
power are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely,
the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in
Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to
be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to
depart from the requirements of Article III. 231
After applying this test, the Court concluded no such threat to the
judicial branch exists, and permitting bankruptcy courts to adjudicate Stern
claims by consent would not “usurp the constitutional prerogatives of
Article III.” 232 The Court emphasized several key points in making its
decision. First, bankruptcy judges “are appointed and subject to removal
by Article III judges.” 233 Second, bankruptcy courts only hear matters
referred to them by the district courts and thus they have no “free-floating
authority” to decide matters. 234 Third, there is no indication that Congress
has tried to encroach upon the judiciary by giving bankruptcy courts the
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ability to hear Stern claims. 235 In short, Article III courts retain complete
supervisory authority over the process. 236
Next, the Court distinguished Stern. 237 It stated that Stern does not
change the result in Wellness because in Stern, the litigant “did not truly
consent to” the bankruptcy court resolution of its claim. 238 The Court also
distinguished Northern Pipeline. 239 The Court explained that in Northern
Pipeline, like Stern, the litigant “did not truly consent to resolution of the
claim against it in a non-Article III forum.” 240 The Court further explained
that the constitutional bar announced in Stern and Northern Pipeline
simply does not govern situations where “litigants may validly consent to
adjudication by a bankruptcy court.” 241 The Court summarizes the point
quite simply: “[T]he cases in which this Court has found a violation of a
litigant’s right to an Article III decisionmaker have involved an objecting
defendant forced to litigate involuntarily before a non-Article III court.” 242
This was not the scenario in Wellness. 243
The Court recounted how Stern was meant to be narrowly construed
and that it did “‘not change all that much’ about the division of labor
between district court and bankruptcy courts.” 244 The majority described
its holding in Wellness as consistent with Stern’s narrow reach. 245 The
Court stated that it was confident that reaffirming approval for adjudication
based on consent “poses no great threat to anyone’s birthrights,
constitutional or otherwise.” 246
Chief Justice Roberts, the author of the majority opinion in Stern,
disagreed and wrote a lengthy dissent in Wellness.247 He characterized the
235
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majority’s interpretation of Stern as an “imaginative reconstruction” and
warned that the Court’s decision allows Congress to encroach upon the
federal judiciary. 248 In short, Chief Justice Roberts did not agree that one
can consent to a constitutional violation. 249 The majority responded by
characterizing Roberts’s dissent as being inconsistent with Stern (i.e., that
it was a narrow decision based on one isolated encroachment by
Congress). 250
Last but not least, the Court explained that consent can be either
express or implied. 251 It reasoned that neither the Constitution, nor the
relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 157, requires express consent. 252 Instead, the
statute only requires “consent simpliciter” and “a requirement of express
consent would be in great tension” with the Court’s prior decisions. 253
However, the Court emphasized “that a litigant’s consent—whether
express or implied—must still be knowing and voluntary.” 254
Interestingly, the Court did not describe any procedure for how lower
courts should determine whether litigants had given express or implied
consent to bankruptcy court adjudication, other than stating that it “would
require a deeply factbound analysis.” 255 Instead, it remanded the case to
the Seventh Circuit for a determination of whether Sharif consented to
adjudication of Wellness’s claims by the bankruptcy court and also
whether Sharif forfeited his Stern argument. 256
On remand, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Sharif forfeited his
Stern argument by waiting too long to raise it. 257 Notably, the Seventh
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Id. at 1957.
Id. at 1961 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 1947 (majority opinion); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620
(2011). The majority goes even further to describe Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent as a
story of how “the world will end not in fire, or ice, but in a bankruptcy court.” Wellness,
135 S. Ct. at 1947.
251 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1947.
252 Id. at 1947–49 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In his
concurring opinion, Justice Alito disagreed with the Court. Id. Justice Alito believes that
consent should be express only. Id.
253 Id. at 1947.
254 Id. at 1948.
255 Id. at 1949.
256 Id.
257 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 617 Fed. App’x 589 (7th Cir. 2015)
(mem.).
249
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Circuit did not answer the consent question at all. 258 It treated the issue on
remand as one of consent or forfeiture rather than one of consent and
forfeiture. 259 The court concluded that since the Supreme Court held that a
litigant can waive his personal right to an Article III adjudicator by
consent, then the personal right can also be forfeited if not properly
raised. 260 However, the end result is the same: Sharif’s Stern objection
will not be addressed. 261

IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE WAKE OF WELLNESS
The Wellness six-to-three majority limited Stern’s impact by holding
that Article III permits bankruptcy courts to decide Stern claims submitted
by consent of the parties. 262 However, several important, practical issues
and unanswered questions remain after Wellness.
It is first important to see what the structure of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction will be after the 1984 Amendments were judicially altered by
the Court’s holdings in Granfinanciera, Stern, Executive Benefits, and
Wellness.
Under the current jurisdictional scheme, four separate
subcategories of bankruptcy jurisdiction exist.
First is the group of “unaltered” core claims under § 157(b)(2). 263
These types of claims were core before the four landmark cases, and they
remain so now. 264 They include all of the core claims listed in § 157(b)(2),
except (1) fraudulent transfer claims where the defendant has requested a
jury trial, 265 and (2) some, but not all, counterclaims by an estate against
persons that have filed claims against the estate. 266 Just as before,
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Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
260 Id.
261
Id.
262 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015).
263 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2) (2012).
264 Id.
265 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989) (holding that “the Seventh
Amendment entitles such a person to a trial by jury, notwithstanding Congress’[s]
designation of fraudulent conveyance actions as ‘core proceedings’ in 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(2)(H)”).
266 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011) (holding that “although the
Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on [defendant]’s
counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional authority to do so”).
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bankruptcy courts can finally adjudicate these unaltered core claims
without the consent of the parties. 267
Second is the group of “unaltered” non-core claims. If a matter was
non-core before the landmark cases, it remains non-core now. 268 This
means that when bankruptcy courts encounter non-core claims, they must
follow the same procedure as before. 269 They can enter final judgment on
these non-core claims if the parties consent to bankruptcy court
adjudication, but if the parties do not consent, then they must submit their
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district courts for
de novo review. 270
Next are the Stern claims. Stern claims comprise the next two
subcategories of the current bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme. Again,
Stern claims are both core under the statute and subject to final
adjudication by the bankruptcy court, but they cannot be decided by a
bankruptcy court due to constitutional concerns. 271 Thus, courts can
proceed with a Stern claim in one of two ways.
First, if the parties do not consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of a
Stern claim, then, under the Court’s holding in Executive Benefits, the
bankruptcy court can treat the claim as non-core and follow the procedure
outlined in § 157(c)(1): hear the matter initially and then submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo
review. 272 Second, if the parties expressly or impliedly consent to
267

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
Determining whether or not a matter is non-core is quite complicated and is beyond
the scope of this Article. For general guidance on this point, see Jack Zarin-Rosenfeld,
Designing Related-to Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390 (2014), Duane Loft,
Jurisdictional Line-Drawing in a Time When So Much Litigation is “Related To”
Bankruptcy: A Practical and Constitutional Solution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1091 (2004),
and Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 68
STAN. L. REV. 747 (2010).
269 “Absent consent, bankruptcy courts in non-core proceedings may only ‘submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,’ which the district courts review de
novo.” Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1940 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)).
270 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
271 See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2170 (2014) (observing
that a “‘Stern claim[]’ [is] a claim designated for final adjudication in the bankruptcy court
as a statutory matter, but prohibited from proceeding in that way as a constitutional
matter”).
272 Id. at 2174 (holding that “because these Stern claims fit comfortably within the
category of claims governed by § 157(c)(1), the Bankruptcy Court would have been
(continued)
268
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bankruptcy court adjudication of a Stern claim, then the bankruptcy court
can enter a final judgment on the claim per the Court’s holding in
Wellness. 273
Perhaps the most striking issue with the two new Stern subcategories is
that the bankruptcy court will hear the Stern claim initially regardless of
whether the parties consent to bankruptcy court adjudication. 274 This is
critically important because it reduces the likelihood of gamesmanship that
might otherwise take place. For example, before Wellness, a bankruptcy
court litigant might not have initially provided consent for bankruptcy
court adjudication of the Stern claim. First, the litigant perhaps did not
know that the Stern issue could be resolved by consent. 275 Second, he or
she may not have wanted the bankruptcy court to hear the matter
initially. 276
The litigant might have chosen to wait to see how the bankruptcy court
would rule on other matters first to get a flavor of the bankruptcy court’s
predispositions or instead seek to withdraw the bankruptcy court’s
reference. By successfully withdrawing the reference, the litigant could
have the district court hear the matter in the first instance.277 Now,
however, because the bankruptcy court will be the first to hear the Stern
claim regardless of the parties’ consent, 278 it may incentivize the parties to
provide consent much earlier in the process. Providing consent would
likely be a good strategic decision in many cases. If a litigant consents, the
bankruptcy court can enter final judgment and the disappointed party can
appeal to the district court. 279 If the litigant does not consent, the
bankruptcy court will still hear the matter initially and provide its report
and recommendation to the district court for de novo review. 280 In all
likelihood, however, the district court will give strong deference to its
permitted to follow the procedures required by that provision, i.e., to submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the District Court to be reviewed de novo”).
273
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944–45 (concluding “that allowing bankruptcy litigants to
waive the right to Article III adjudication of Stern claims does not usurp the constitutional
prerogatives of Article III courts”).
274 See Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2174. See also Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944–45.
275 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944–45.
276 Id.
277 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
278 See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2174 (2014). See also
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944–45.
279 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2012).
280 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1940.
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judicial colleague on the bankruptcy court who took the time to learn the
facts, frame the issues, analyze the law, and recommend a course of
action. 281
Nevertheless, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure force
litigants to decide whether to consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of a
Stern claim (or a non-core claim) at the beginning of the adversary process.
Wellness made this point as well. 282 The procedural rules already require
that pleadings in adversary proceedings contain a statement specifying the
following: (1) whether or not the matter is core or non-core; and (2) if the
matter is non-core, whether the pleader consents to final adjudication by
the bankruptcy court. 283 Thus, the real issue for the Stern-claim litigant, as
plaintiff, might be when to commence the litigation, because he or she will
have to choose whether to provide consent at the very beginning of the
process. 284 The issue for the Stern claim litigant, as defendant, is not as
complicated. He or she will have to make a decision on the issue of
consent when filing an answer. 285
Because bankruptcy courts will initially hear Stern claims regardless of
consent, 286 the balance of work between bankruptcy courts and district
courts may return to its pre-Stern form (i.e., the reference will be
withdrawn from bankruptcy courts far less often). 287 This will be helpful
to the federal judiciary, generally, because district court dockets are
overburdened, and they certainly do not need the extra workload that Stern
creates. 288 However, if bankruptcy courts are uncertain about entering a
final adjudication on a matter, they will increasingly make reports and
recommendations to the district courts for de novo review. 289 This will
281

See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1949.
283 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008 (opening pleadings); id. at 7012 (responsive pleadings).
Notice that FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b) requires express consent. Id. This was one of
Justice Thomas’s points in his dissent. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1961 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
284 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008.
285 Id. at 7012.
286 See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
288 See Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering
Where Congress Is,
HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 1, 2015, 9:34
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courtsvacancies_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b.
289 See supra notes 169–175 and accompanying text.
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shift the burden back to the district courts. 290 Thus, it will be interesting to
see whether the balance of work between bankruptcy and district courts
will ever return to pre-Stern levels.
After Wellness, several significant questions remain. Have the
legislature and the judiciary finally resolved their separation of powers tugof-war over the scope of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction? Will any other
core provisions of § 157(b)(2) be struck down as unconstitutional? Each
topic provides fodder for additional scholarly inquiry and debate.
It is quite doubtful we have seen the last of Article III challenges to the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. However, the six-to-three majority in
Wellness certainly signaled a cease-fire with the legislature, at least for the
time being. The majority of the Court would like for the bankruptcy courts
to get back to business as usual. From the majority’s view, the current
structure of bankruptcy jurisdiction does not threaten the federal
judiciary’s power in any significant way. 291
One area of concern, perhaps, is whether the Court will strike down
any other core provisions in § 157(b)(2). Examining the non-exhaustive
list of sixteen categories of core claims, 292 it is certainly possible that more
will be subject to constitutional attack in future cases. Many of these core
claims could incorporate elements of state law. If so, it is likely that
bankruptcy courts will hesitate to enter final orders and instead submit
reports and recommendations to the district court for de novo review. 293
However, even if bankruptcy courts do not follow this procedure and
instead enter a final judgment on a claim where they lacked constitutional
authority to do so, the error could be cured by the district court undertaking
a de novo review of the bankruptcy court’s final judgment. This is exactly
what occurred in Executive Benefits. 294 Because there are more ways to
avoid reversible error with respect to Stern claims (and Stern-like claims),
fewer controversial cases should arise in this area in the future. Wellness
settled the dust for now.

V. CONCLUSION
Wellness does not resolve all the issues uncovered, but left
unanswered, by Stern; however, the decision seems to at least signal the
290
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292 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)–(P) (2012).
293 Int’l Bank of Commerce v. Saenz (In re Saenz), 516 B.R. 423, 426 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2014).
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Court’s willingness to show restraint when it comes to finding Article III
violations within the bankruptcy court system. In Wellness, the majority
agreed that the current functionality of the judiciary and the practical effect
of its decision are more important than strict adherence to formalistic and
unbending rules. 295 They concluded that there is no real threat to the
judicial branch from the bankruptcy courts and thus there is no need to
dismantle a system that is working quite well. 296
Nevertheless, when the Court reviews additional bankruptcy cases,
which it certainly will, it may very well hold that other core provisions of
§ 157 are also unconstitutional. That question was not before the Court in
Wellness, Executive Benefits, or Stern. 297 If additional core provisions are
held unconstitutional, it will likely prompt Congress to attempt to find a
legislative solution, just as it did after Northern Pipeline.
However, this seems unlikely in the near future. With six Justices on
the Court strongly favoring a very narrow construction of Stern, Chief
Justice Roberts will likely be unable to sway the majority of the Court
toward his view that Congress is unconstitutionally stripping power from
the judicial branch, statute by statute. 298 Thus, Congress should take a
wait-and-see approach before attempting any patchwork legislation.
While Stern chipped away at the semblance of stability within the
bankruptcy court system, Wellness certainly pushed back and limited the
impact of that decision. For now, the judiciary has issued a ceasefire in its
struggle with the legislative branch over the proper scope of bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Hopefully this will result in more stability and efficiency
within the federal courts.
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